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1995 Review and Extension Conference

of the Parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/SR.5
1 May 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

MAIN COMMITTEE II

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 27 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

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REVIEW OF ARTICLE III AND OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND TO THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III AND OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND TO THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS

Article III: State systems of accounting and control (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.3)

1. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) introduced the working paper on State systems of accounting and control (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.3), which was based on the consensus language adopted at the Fourth Review Conference in 1990 but also incorporated developments since 1990, in particular with regard to "Programme 93 + 2" and related activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/7/Part I). The aim of the working paper was to ensure that the Conference recognized the importance of State systems of accounting and control and of existing regional safeguards systems.

2. Paragraph 1 of the working paper included a reference to the New Partnership approach developed between IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement between IAEA, Brazil, Argentina and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). In paragraph 2 of the working paper, the Conference noted the further efforts of IAEA to strengthen cooperation and enhance the cost-effectiveness of safeguards in the States of the European Union, and in paragraph 3 it called upon States to take safeguards requirements into account when planning, designing and constructing new nuclear facilities, thereby facilitating the work of IAEA and the establishment of a State system of safeguards.

3. Ms. DELPECH (France) emphasized that the fact that EURATOM had nearly four decades of experience should be reflected in the working paper. Therefore her delegation proposed an amendment to paragraph 1 by inserting at the end of the second sentence, following the word "EURATOM", the words "which enables both agencies to benefit to the fullest possible extent from their lengthy experience".

4. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) endorsed the amendment proposed by France and said that his delegation proposed an amendment to paragraph 2 by inserting the words "the Agency's" in the second sentence so that it read "enhancing the cost-effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards in the States of the European Union", in order to avoid confusion with EURATOM safeguards, which were also mentioned in the working paper.

5. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) welcomed the implementation of the New Partnership approach between IAEA and EURATOM and asked whether either agency could provide further details regarding specific actions to implement the partnership and clarify whether the approach could be extended to other regions. He suggested that the second sentence in paragraph 2 of the working paper was not emphatic

enough in urging intensified collaboration between States and IAEA with regard to the establishment of new State or regional systems.

6. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) endorsed the amendment proposed by France, but did not agree with that of Germany, since he believed the reference was to safeguards in general, and not just those applied by IAEA.

7. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) endorsed the amendments proposed by France and Germany and believed that the reference in paragraph 2 to the efforts to establish new or improved State or regional systems was sufficient.

8. Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) said that increased cooperation between IAEA and EURATOM would lead to greater cost-effectiveness on the part of IAEA, and he endorsed the amendment proposed by Germany.

9. Mr. HAMEL (IAEA) said in reply to the representative of Malaysia that the New Partnership between IAEA and EURATOM was well under way and was making use of the capabilities of both agencies while avoiding duplication of efforts. The New Partnership approach was a concept that had also been incorporated into "Programme 93 + 2" which relied on the development of cooperation between IAEA and State systems - and, where they existed, regional systems - of accounting and control.

10. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that he endorsed the French amendment to paragraph 1. He also proposed that, in the last line of that paragraph, the word "improving" should be replaced by the word "extending", so that the wording would be "... as a positive development in extending regional systems." The existing language gave the inaccurate impression that ABACC took the concept of regional development even further than EURATOM.

11. His delegation agreed with the Malaysian delegation that the important question was not the further development of the New Partnership approach and the efficiency of safeguards in the States of the European Union, but rather the need to explore the possibility of extending regional systems and increasing collaboration among them and IAEA world wide. He therefore suggested that the whole second sentence of paragraph 2 should be deleted.

12. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that he supported the amendments proposed by France and Germany, which helped clarify the text. With regard to the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2, he would need more time to consider it.

13. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States) said that his delegation supported IAEA efforts to work with States and regional systems to improve them, but felt that cooperation between States was also important. He therefore proposed that in the last sentence of paragraph 2, the words "and among States" should be added after "IAEA". The text would then read "... collaboration between States and IAEA and among States with regard to ...".

14. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that, in the first line of paragraph 1, the words "and regional" should be added after the word "State", so that it would read "... the importance of State and regional systems of

accounting ...". Also, at the end of paragraph 1, the words "in improving regional systems" should be deleted.

15. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that his delegation endorsed the amendments proposed by France, Russia and Germany. His delegation did not, however, agree with the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2. As the IAEA representative had mentioned, the final report on the partnership had not yet been issued; work on the matter was still in progress. His delegation therefore wished to retain that sentence, with the change proposed by the delegation of Germany.

16. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) said that he agreed with the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that he intended to prepare an updated draft of working paper 3 to reflect the various changes proposed and to submit it to the open-ended informal working group.

Article III: Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.5)

18. Mr. WALKER (Australia) introduced the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.5), which was based on the consensus language adopted at the Fourth Review Conference in 1990 but had been updated to take into account events since 1990. In paragraph 1, the Conference underlined the importance of international verification of the transfer to peaceful or non-proscribed military utilization of nuclear-weapon materials that had been withdrawn from weapons use. The Conference supported unilateral offers to place excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards and urged all nuclear-weapon States to offer for verification any nuclear materials and nuclear installations that were transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities. Furthermore, the Conference strongly supported negotiation of a fissile material cut-off convention. In paragraph 2 of the working paper, the Conference called for substantial progress without delay towards the separation of the peaceful and the military nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, noting that it strongly believed that supplies for peaceful purposes should be subject to the safeguards agreements concluded between the nuclear-weapon States and IAEA.

19. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation supported negotiation of a fissile material cut-off convention, as mentioned in paragraph 1. However, to mention the convention in that specific paragraph, which concerned safeguards in nuclear-weapon States, would narrow and change the meaning of those negotiations. The reference to a cut-off convention should be placed in the preamble or in some other part of the document, and in a more general form. In any case, it should be deleted from paragraph 1 of working paper 5.

20. Turning to paragraph 2, he noted that much of the wording of the Final Document of the 1990 Review Conference was repeated in the text of working paper 5. He wished to stress, however, that at that Conference, the whole issue of separating peaceful and military uses had been stated much more appropriately. The issue was a technical rather than a political one;

therefore, not only time but also a great deal of money was required to address it. The words "without delay" in the first sentence of paragraph 2 should be deleted. It would not be right to take on commitments which, for technical reasons, could not be physically fulfilled within a short period of time. The words "safeguards in nuclear-weapon States should bear in mind the available resources within the Agency" should also be included in the text.

21. Ms. DELPECH (France) said that, although her delegation was willing to accept language regarding a fissile-material cut-off convention, it did not agree with the placing of the reference to such a convention. In the view of her delegation, and probably many other delegations, the cut-off convention was particularly aimed at drawing in those States which were not parties to the Treaty and which were not, as far as she knew, nuclear-weapon States. The sentence should therefore be moved to another place in the final document.

22. Turning to paragraph 2, she said that the first sentence should be deleted. The wording in the 1990 Final Document was different in very substantial ways, inasmuch as it invited nuclear-weapon States to submit all their peaceful nuclear facilities to safeguards. The new text, on the other hand, spoke of substantial progress. Her delegation did not see how any substantial progress could be made in that area. The words "without delay" were also inappropriate.

23. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation agreed that the reference to the cut-off convention did not belong in the section pertaining to safeguards in nuclear-weapon States. In fact, the matter did not even fall within the scope of Main Committee II, as it had been discussed at length in Main Committee I.

24. With regard to paragraph 2, he said that Italy would very much like to see the separation of peaceful and military nuclear facilities implemented; however, as Russia and France had pointed out, the issue was a technical one. To call for something that everyone knew could not happen soon was self-defeating. His delegation was not opposed to the wording, but felt that it would be more appropriate to replace the words "substantial progress" by the words "further progress", and to replace the words "without delay" by the words "as soon as possible". His delegation would not go so far as to delete the sentence altogether.

25. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 might be amended to read: "The Conference calls on all States which have not yet done so to place their sensitive civilian materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) as a first step under international safeguards." That language had been accepted by the European Union in 1994. Such an amendment would also replace part of paragraph 2, and help to streamline working paper 5 in general.

26. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that the German proposal, although useful, departed too much from the reference to excess military material, which was the main point of paragraph 1, and went into the question of the possible extension of safeguards to all separated civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium, whether or not of military origin. He therefore suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1, the text following the words "urges all nuclear-weapon States" should be amended to read: "to bring separated plutonium and highly

enriched uranium no longer required for military purposes under international safeguards."

27. With regard to the first sentence of paragraph 2, his delegation agreed with the comments made by the French delegation, since the United Kingdom would also have difficulty with making "substantial progress" towards the separation of peaceful and military nuclear facilities, and was not convinced that delay had anything to do with it. In a spirit of compromise, he would suggest replacing the words "substantial progress" by the words "further progress".

28. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, he suggested that, after the words "nuclear supplies", the words "delivered to them" should be inserted in order to reflect the fact that the text was not intended as a call to nuclear-weapon States to control exports more strictly, but rather to give non-nuclear-weapon States certain formal commitments.

29. Lastly, his delegation questioned the use of the word "strongly" in the last sentence of both paragraphs. That word was not used in any of the other working papers, and it was not clear why it was used in working paper 5.

30. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that he supported the German proposal. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, the wording should read "... the recent unilateral offer ...", since, as far as he knew, only one country, the United States, had made such an offer.

31. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said he had no objection to the idea of transferring the reference to the cut-off convention to the text being drafted by Main Committee I or to some other location.

32. His delegation was prepared to accept the change in paragraph 1 proposed by the United Kingdom. However, the first sentence of the paragraph created some difficulty, partly because of the lack of clarity regarding the intention of the paragraph and partly because the verification of transfers was a very complex issue. His delegation had consulted informally with some other delegations, and wished to suggest that the sentence should be deleted. An addition to the second sentence of paragraph 1 might accomplish the objective sought in the first sentence. He therefore suggested that the following words should be added at the end of the language proposed by the United Kingdom: "in order to demonstrate the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear-arms reductions".

33. Turning to the last sentence in paragraph 2, he noted that the words "these supplies" referred to the supplies mentioned in the second sentence, i.e., the supplies delivered to nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes. It further stated that those supplies should be subject to safeguards agreements. The safeguards agreement between the United States and IAEA provided for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material and all nuclear facilities except those of direct national-security significance. Because of the character of the agreement, his Government would be unable to do what was asked for in that sentence. He therefore suggested that the beginning of the sentence should be replaced by the words: "The Conference believes that nuclear-material supplies for peaceful purposes should be subject ...".

34. With regard to the amendment proposed by Germany, he said that his delegation needed more time to consider it.

35. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that, in the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the word "offer", the words "on a voluntary basis" should be added. He agreed with the proposal to delete the last sentence of paragraph 1, for the same reasons already mentioned by other delegations. The Chinese Government supported the negotiation and conclusion of the cut-off convention; however, to discuss, in connection with safeguards, a convention that had yet to come into being was inappropriate and might even be misleading.

36. With regard to the German proposal, he said that it lacked clarity on many points. For instance, whether plutonium and highly enriched uranium could be regarded as civilian material or sensitive civilian material was still not clear to his delegation.

37. In the first sentence of paragraph 2, his delegation agreed that the word "substantial" should be replaced by "further" and the words "without delay" should be deleted. After that sentence, a new sentence should be added, reading: "The Conference recognizes the value of the voluntary safeguards agreements of the five nuclear-weapon States in strengthening the non-proliferation regime." In fact, that wording reflected the consensus reached in 1990. That could be followed by the words "with respect to those nuclear supplies". As to whether they should be under IAEA safeguards, his delegation shared the view of the United Kingdom that separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium no longer required for military purposes should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

38. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that, in the last sentence of paragraph 1, the Conference might wish to note that the conclusion of a cut-off convention would result in a significant extension of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States. The drafters of working paper 5 would attempt to accommodate all the concerns that had been expressed by delegations.

Article III: Financing safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.4)

39. Mr. SIERLA (Finland) introduced the working paper on the financing of safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.4), which called upon States parties to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty. The Conference requested IAEA to continue to identify all resources needed to meet its safeguards responsibilities and urged all States to ensure that the Agency was provided with those resources. In paragraph 2, the Conference encouraged significant contributions by States parties to the safeguards development programme by facilitating and assisting the application of safeguards and in supporting research and development to strengthen and advance the application of effective and efficient safeguards.

40. Ms. DRDAKOVÁ (Czech Republic) said that the first sentence of paragraph 1 should be replaced by the corresponding wording of the 1990 Final Document, in which the Conference called upon States parties to continue their political,

technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to ensure that IAEA was able to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty and its increasing safeguards responsibilities.

41. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) said that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be reworded to reflect the Agency's other important functions. In the third sentence of paragraph 1, the Conference should also take account of the ways in which the IAEA Statute guided the Agency on safeguards financing. The guiding principle should be that contained in the Statute and in document INFCIRC/153. The Conference should also take account of the nuclear-weapon States' voluntary offer to IAEA.

42. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the representative of Malaysia should submit his proposals in writing.

43. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) proposed that, after the first sentence of paragraph 1, a new sentence should be added, reading: "The Conference notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system has had to function."

44. He also proposed the addition, at the end of paragraph 2, of the words "and that additional States extend their cooperation and support".

45. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) said that, in the last sentence of paragraph 1, the order of the words "lasting" and "equitable" should be reversed, since it was more important that the solution should be equitable.

46. Mr. CHEBO (Cameroon) said that his delegation supported the United States representative's proposal to add a new sentence in paragraph 1. However, in the view of his delegation, the new sentence should be the first sentence of the paragraph and not the second.

47. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that his delegation accepted the proposal made by the representative of Cameroon.

Article III: Plutonium (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.9)

48. Mr. BOJER (Denmark) introduced the working paper on plutonium (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.9), in which the Conference recognized that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful purposes was expected to increase over the next several years and expressed satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing and the storage of separated plutonium. In paragraph 2, the Conference called for greater transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. It encouraged the relevant States to use restraint when stockpiling such materials and reaffirmed that all such excess fissile material should be under IAEA safeguards. Finally, the Conference encouraged States to continue to examine long-term arrangements for the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

49. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said that working paper 9 took up a discussion that had long been held between IAEA and the plutonium-producing or plutonium-using countries. The paper should reflect the development of that discussion in different forums, in particular the group established by the Director General of IAEA, which met regularly in Vienna. Since the last two sentences of paragraph 2 dealt with outdated ideas, they should be deleted.

50. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that the last sentence of paragraph 1 should be amended to read:

> "The Conference welcomes the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing and to the storage of separated plutonium, and urges that it continue."

51. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation did not agree with the representative of Germany that the ideas expressed in the last two sentences of paragraph 2 were outdated. Those ideas were "dormant" and could still be revived. Consequently, his delegation was in favour of retaining the last two sentences of paragraph 2.

52. Mr. COOK (New Zealand) said that the projected increase in the use of separated plutonium presented a number of problems, since small quantities of plutonium could be used for the construction of nuclear weapons and therefore required stringent measures to ensure their physical protection and security. The Agency had made a considerable effort to ensure that special difficulties in safeguarding such materials were overcome and that safeguards on reprocessing and storage facilities for plutonium were fully effective. At the same time, the projected increase in separated plutonium would place a heavy burden on the Agency's safeguards resources. The text should also mention that there were concerns about the safety of shipping plutonium by sea.

53. His delegation strongly supported the forthcoming negotiations to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons as a further contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. However, since, from a technical point of view, there was no difference between military and civilian weapons-grade material, a cut-off convention should be supplemented by concrete measures to provide greater international confidence in plutonium management. The Conference's endorsement of the points in the proposed text would represent a step forward.

54. Further consideration should be given to the long-term management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, which should include the possibility of the Agency's making the necessary arrangements for the deposit of such material. The establishment of regional nuclear-fuel centres under IAEA administration should also be considered. Unlike the representative of Germany, his delegation felt that the last two sentences of paragraph 2 should be retained.

55. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Italy. There was no harm in retaining the last two sentences of paragraph 2, and it might perhaps be useful to add a reference to article XII (A) (5) of the IAEA Statute.

56. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that his delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of Germany. Further, he proposed that the word "excess" should be deleted from the third sentence of paragraph 2, since States parties to the Treaty already had all their fissile material under IAEA safeguards. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the word "reprocessing", the word "handling" should be inserted.

57. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that the words "for civil purposes" should be added at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2.

58. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that his delegation supported the arguments forwarded by the German representative, since there was considerable doubt as to whether an international plutonium-storage centre or a regional nuclear-fuel centre owned and managed by IAEA was a feasible concept for the foreseeable future, if only because of the enormous capital investment involved.

59. With regard to the reference in the second sentence in paragraph 2 to "excess" stockpiles, he noted that ordinary working stocks needed just as much safeguarding and protection as "excess" stocks. The very definition of the word "excess" posed a considerable problem. He proposed that paragraph 2 should be reformulated to read:

> "The Conference calls for greater transparency on matters relating to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for civil purposes. The Conference notes the existence of substantial stocks of separated plutonium and reaffirms that all such stocks should be under international safeguards. The Conference urges users and producers of plutonium to continue to examine long-term arrangements for the management and use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. These arrangements could include consideration of arrangements for deposit with IAEA, as envisaged in its Statute, of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium as an additional precaution against diversion of direct-use materials to nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, as well as the possibility of regional fuel centres."

60. Mrs. COLL (Ireland) said that her delegation hoped that the last two sentences of paragraph 2 would be retained in some form. In the light of the progress achieved since the end of the cold war, it was not the time to renounce ideas that had been put forward when the likelihood of their realization had been minimal. While the proposal made by the representative of the United Kingdom appeared promising, it should be examined more closely.

61. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that his delegation looked forward to the new text that would be issued on the basis of the proposals made by various delegations. The extensive reformulation of paragraph 2 proposed by the United Kingdom representative seemed to suggest that future work should be reserved for producers and users of plutonium; that was not the view of his delegation.

62. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation supported the Chinese representative's amendment of the first sentence of paragraph 2. The current language of the last two sentences of paragraph 2 was appropriate and did not require the radical reformulation proposed by the representative of the United

Kingdom. His delegation supported the proposal made by the Australian representative.

63. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) said that his delegation supported the two amendments proposed by the Belgian representative. In the second sentence of paragraph 1 he suggested that the words "of fuel" should be inserted after the word "reprocessing" in order to ensure that the word "reprocessing" was not construed as referring to separated plutonium. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, the words "such material" should be replaced by "fissile material", which was more likely to be stockpiled than nuclear material.

Article III: Physical protection (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8)

64. Mr. POTUYT (Netherlands) introduced the working paper on physical protection (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8), in which the Conference noted the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material, especially that usable for military purposes, and called on nuclear-weapon States to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear-weapon systems and materials. Furthermore, the Conference expressed grave concern at reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials since the last Review Conference and noted the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection. In paragraph 2, the Conference urged all States that had not done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest possible date. In paragraph 3, the Conference recognized the non-proliferation benefits of the conversion of civilian research reactors from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium and recommended that international cooperation to facilitate such conversion should be continued.

65. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation), referring to the first sentence of the first paragraph, said that if the material referred to was direct-use material, then the call should be addressed to all States using that material. He suggested that the second part of the first sentence should read: "and calls on all States to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of direct-use materials." He also proposed that the end of the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the words "to protect", should be amended to read: "and ensure the security of such material." In addition, at the end of paragraph 2, the words "including separated plutonium" should be deleted.

66. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said he felt that the responsibility of States for such material should be emphasized more strongly. He therefore proposed that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be moved to the beginning of paragraph 2. The latter would read: "The Conference notes the responsibility of all States to protect and ensure the security of material that may be used for nuclear weapons. It expresses grave concern at reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials since the last Review Conference. The Conference notes the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection, and in this respect welcomes the work being conducted under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on this issue." He also supported the proposal by the representative of the Russian Federation to delete the last three words of paragraph 2.

67. His delegation felt strongly that the second sentence of paragraph 3 should be deleted, since it called for restrictions on technological development which the German Government could not accept.

68. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that the new wording proposed by the German delegation for paragraph 2 was an improvement, as was the text proposed by the Russian Federation for paragraph 1.

69. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) supported the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3; each State had the right to choose whatever fuel cycles it considered appropriate.

70. Mr. ROSU (Romania) proposed that, in the last sentence of the first paragraph, after the words "physical protection", the words "and prevention of illicit trafficking" should be inserted.

71. Ms. KUROKOCHI (Japan), Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) and Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) supported the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3.

72. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be amended in order to call upon States to ensure the security of all nuclear materials, not only those that could contribute to the construction of nuclear weapons; and in the last line of paragraph 2, the words "enriched uranium" should be added before "separated plutonium". He also concurred with the proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3.

73. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that, while he understood the concern of the German delegation regarding the second sentence of paragraph 3, he felt that rather than deleting it, it should be amended to read: "It recommends that the use of high-enriched uranium in new civilian reactors be avoided to the extent possible."

74. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that the figure 53, the number of States which had acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, should be inserted at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2.

75. Mr. AYETOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation had no problem with the amendments that had been proposed. However, in the fifth line of paragraph 1, the word "reports" was inappropriate. While it was indeed necessary to put a stop to any trafficking of nuclear materials if and when it occurred, he wondered about the reliability of the reports referred to. It was important to avoid overdramatization in the final document; the Committee should avoid referring to those unconfirmed reports in such a way as to give the impression that they were necessarily all true.

76. The CHAIRMAN, speaking in his personal capacity, supported by Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation), suggested that the use of the word "reports" was intended to avoid precisely that overdramatization.

77. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that, since some of the reports had proved to be well-founded, the word "reports" should be replaced by "evidence".

78. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria), speaking as one of the drafters of the working paper, said that the word "reports" had been chosen because it was precisely the fact that the trafficking had been reported which had alerted the international community to the problem.

79. Mr. AYETOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that any overdramatized version of the facts would be reflected in the media, whose exaggerated account of the trafficking would lead to further alarm in the international community; it could become a vicious circle. The Committee should take only verified facts into account.

80. The CHAIRMAN considered that all delegations were in agreement on the fact that the trafficking really existed, and on the need to avoid overstating the situation.

81. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said that Germany was doing all that was possible and scientifically advisable to convert research reactors from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. He could not accept the suggestion of the United States delegation to retain the second sentence of paragraph 3 in an amended form; the first and third sentences of that paragraph stated the case sufficiently well.

82. He also suggested that it would be more appropriate for the subject of the use of high-enriched uranium in civilian reactors to be discussed in Main Committee III, under the heading of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

83. Mr. WALKER (Australia), referring to the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3, said that it would be strange if the Conference called for the conversion of existing resources to low-enriched uranium while remaining silent on the question of construction of new research reactors.

84. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) agreed with the Australian delegation. He also concurred with the point made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the second sentence of paragraph 1, and proposed that the word "instances" should be substituted for the word "reports".

85. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) concurred with the remarks made by the United States and Australian delegations. He proposed that the second sentence of paragraph 3 should read: "It recommends that new civilian reactors minimize as much as possible the use of high-enriched uranium as fuel."

86. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom), regarding paragraph 3, said that the first protection against proliferation risks must be the commitment of the States involved, coupled with international safeguards. The Conference should be extremely cautious about seeking to proscribe, or strongly to discourage, a legitimate form of peaceful nuclear activity pursued by a responsible State.

87. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) supported the suggestion made by the United States delegation. He suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should refer to "reported instances of illicit trafficking".

88. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) concurred with the wording proposed by the United States.

89. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, to avoid spending too much time on minor drafting matters, the Committee should accept the wording for paragraph 1 proposed by the representative of the United States.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/SR.6
2 May 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

MAIN COMMITTEE II

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 28 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

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REVIEW OF ARTICLE III AND OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND TO THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS (continued)

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VII

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Any corrections to the records of this meeting and of other meetings of the Conference will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the Conference.

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III AND OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND TO THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS (continued)

Article III: Export licensing (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.7 and WP.12)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to two working papers on the subject of export licensing (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.7 and WP.12).

2. Working paper 7, concerning the importance of national export- and import-control mechanisms, described the work of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in encouraging States to apply an agreed set of guidelines to the export of certain equipment and materials. For that purpose, the Zangger Committee had produced a list, known as the "trigger list", of items triggering IAEA safeguards.

3. Working paper 12, which consisted of a single paragraph, also dealt with export-control policies and the guidelines of the two aforementioned groups.

4. Mrs. TISCHLER (Germany), supported by Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) and Mrs. DELPECH (France), proposed an amendment to working paper 7 by adding the following at the end of paragraph 4:

> "The Conference notes with appreciation the decision of some States parties to give the IAEA comprehensive information about the export and import of nuclear-related materials, equipment and technology. The Conference recognizes that such transparency of international transfers enhances confidence among States parties, that international nuclear trade and exchange serves exclusively to promote peaceful objectives, and that it strengthens the capability of the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively."

5. Mr. ROSU (Romania) welcomed the content of working paper 7, and supported the amendment proposed by the German delegation. He proposed that the text of working paper 12 should be added to the beginning of working paper 7 as a new paragraph 1.

6. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the existing paragraph 1 of working paper 7 should become the last sentence of the new paragraph 1, except that it should then begin with "It urges all States parties ...".

7. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) proposed that, in the proposed new paragraph 1, the words "and the Nuclear Suppliers Group" should be deleted.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that the representative of Romania had agreed that the last part of that sentence, beginning with the words "by supporting or strengthening", could be deleted.

9. Mr. BAEIDINEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that guidelines for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes should not be agreed within

closed clubs such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In the interest of transparency, any such guidelines should be decided in a forum open to all States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

10. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) supported the amendment proposed by the German delegation.

11. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) also supported the German amendment. He also proposed that paragraph 5 should be amended to read:

> "The Conference further notes that a number of States parties also cooperate in an informal group known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). NSG members have established agreed guidelines for the export of nuclear and nuclear-related items, which are published in IAEA document INFCIRC/254 as amended."

12. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) proposed that the following words should be added at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 4: "and to adhere to the understandings as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as amended."

13. Mr. WANG Jun (China) proposed that the end of the original first sentence of working paper 7 should be amended to read "... to acquire, develop or construct nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices."

14. His delegation would welcome the opportunity to discuss the ideas put forward by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran for a forum open to all States for the discussion and formulation of global guidelines.

15. Mrs. DELPECH (France) supported the amendments proposed by the delegations of the United Kingdom and Austria.

16. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) concurred with the amendments proposed by the German and Austrian delegations in respect of paragraph 4, and by the United Kingdom delegation in respect of paragraph 5.

17. Regarding the Iranian proposal, it should be understood by all that the Zangger Committee included representatives of 34 States from various regions of the world, and that the guidelines that it had produced were applied by individual States on their own responsibility. The same applied to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had been established to complement the work of the Zangger Committee in certain areas not covered by its proceedings. The two groups were open to new members, they functioned within the spirit of the non-proliferation Treaty, and their proceedings were not secret; if any States wished to follow the example of the two groups, that would be a welcome development.

18. Mrs. TISCHLER (Germany) supported the amendments proposed by the United Kingdom and Austrian delegations regarding paragraph 4.

19. Ms. DRDAKOVA (Czech Republic) endorsed the amendments proposed by Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria.

20. Mr. PARNOHADININGRAT (Indonesia) endorsed the views expressed by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran and said that any guidelines regarding the transfer of technology should be discussed in a broad forum that included the participation of all States parties to the Treaty so that the guidelines satisfied all States parties.

21. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) endorsed the United Kingdom's amendment to paragraph 5 and said that, while it was the role of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to reach informal agreements on the general guidelines for export licensing, it remained within the competence of individual States to apply those guidelines in the form of export-licensing policies.

22. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) drew attention to a working paper entitled "Multilateral nuclear supply principles" (NPT/CONF.1995/21), which contained information about the Zangger Committee and would help to clarify the allocation of Treaty responsibilities at the national level. He emphasized that it was the responsibility of each State to adopt the requirements of the Treaty in its legislation. He said that Greece should be added to the list of countries that had submitted that working paper.

23. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) endorsed the views of the representative of Indonesia and said that his delegation believed that emphasis should be placed on multilateral efforts aimed at transparency rather than the establishment of informal groups.

24. Mr. BAEIDINEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation did not question the logic behind the establishment of groups such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but emphasized that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had objected to the formation of "closed door" clubs for the establishment of guidelines for the transfer of technology. If the decisions of such bodies were to be consistent with the objectives of the Treaty, they should be adopted with the participation of all States parties and not on an informal and secretive basis.

25. Mr. ABU-HADID (Syrian Arab Republic) endorsed the views expressed by the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Indonesia and Nigeria and said that his delegation did not accept paragraph 5 of working paper 7 as it stood, especially in the light of the amendments proposed to paragraph 4 which referred to the Zangger Committee. His delegation believed that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation were adequate for use by the Conference and not in need of review, and proposed that paragraph 4 should be deleted from working paper 7.

26. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) endorsed the views of the representative of Indonesia and said his delegation believed that the multiplication of "closed door" groups did not correspond to the objectives of transparency and favoured a multilateral framework for gathering information.

27. Mr. WALKER (Australia), introducing a working paper on IAEA safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.15), said that the text responded to a widely expressed concern that non-nuclear-weapon States which had not accepted non-proliferation commitments and full-scope safeguards should not receive nuclear supplies from parties to the Treaty. The text said exactly that, and concluded by urging

those suppliers which had not yet done so to require such conditions without delay. He wished to thank the many delegations whose suggestions were reflected in the actual wording.

28. The CHAIRMAN said that the working paper introduced by Australia would be taken up in the framework of the informal open-ended working group under the topic of export licensing.

29. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to a composite draft text of the introduction, pertaining to article III, that had been circulated as an informal paper. He pointed out that the last sentence of paragraph 3 was in square brackets; a decision on that sentence would be made later on, as the study of other draft texts progressed. He asked whether the Committee was prepared to approve the text as it stood, leaving in the square brackets for the time being. If the Committee agreed, the text could be passed on to the Drafting Committee of the Conference.

30. Mr. WANG Jun (China) asked whether delegations might have another opportunity to consider the sentence that was in square brackets.

31. The CHAIRMAN said that the sentence in square brackets would be clarified in the context of the section on safeguards, which would be examined by the Committee on 1 May.

32. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that, although he sympathized with the Chinese request, he felt that the matter could be left up to the Chairman, on the understanding that the decision to leave the square brackets did not prejudge the final language to be adopted. With regard to paragraph 4, he pointed out that the version that was before the Committee did not accurately reflect the agreed text. The words "placing all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards" should therefore be deleted.

33. The CHAIRMAN said that the text should indeed be corrected as noted by the United States delegation. He also confirmed that leaving the square brackets was without prejudice to the positions of members.

34. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that his delegation was willing to maintain the square brackets for the time being. In paragraph 5, however, after the words "the safeguards required by article III shall be implemented in a manner designed", the words "to comply with article IV of the Treaty and" were missing. Those words should be restored in order to maintain the actual language of article III, paragraph 3, of the Treaty.

35. Mr. WANG Jun (China) endorsed the United Kingdom proposal.

36. The CHAIRMAN said he would take it that the Committee agreed to reinstate the words "to comply with article IV and" in paragraph 5 of the draft text.

37. It was so decided.

38. The CHAIRMAN said he would take it that the Committee agreed that he should transmit the draft text entitled "Article III - Introduction", as corrected and amended, to the Drafting Committee of the Conference, on the understanding that

the Committee's approval of the text did not prejudge any delegation's position on the sentence that remained in square brackets.

39. It was so decided.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VII

40. Mr. WANG Jun (China) introduced a working paper on the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation, nuclear safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10). Section I highlighted the positive role of the non-proliferation Treaty in containing nuclear-weapon proliferation and the preservation of international peace and security. Section II discussed the importance of IAEA safeguards and what principles should be observed in improving the safeguards regime. In section III, the Conference supported the establishment on a voluntary basis of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction and welcomed the fact that all nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It urged other nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that had not signed Additional Protocols II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga to do so at an early date. The Conference supported the efforts made by the African and Middle Eastern countries to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones free of weapons of mass destruction in their respective regions.

41. He proposed that the working paper should be merged with the Egyptian working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13).

42. Mr. ERFAN (Egypt) introduced a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13) which discussed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general and, specifically, recent events in the Middle East regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. The Conference urged all States of the Middle East to take the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of such a zone, and called upon all States of the region, pending the establishment of the zone, in particular Israel, which had a significant nuclear programme, to declare solemnly that they would refrain from developing, producing, testing or acquiring nuclear weapons and from permitting the stationing on their territories or territories under their control of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

43. His delegation welcomed the proposal of the Chinese delegation to merge the two working papers.

44. Mr. ABDUL MOMIN (Brunei Darussalam) introduced a working paper on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.14), in which the Conference noted that the representatives of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) emphasized their determination to intensify efforts for the early establishment of such a zone. The Conference noted further that the idea of establishing the zone had been endorsed by other South-East Asian countries and constituted a concrete contribution of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to nuclear disarmament as stipulated in the non-proliferation Treaty.

45. Mr. COOK (New Zealand) introduced a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.16), which emphasized the importance of concluding

such zones in harmony with internationally recognized principles and recognized that the cooperation of all nuclear-weapon States was essential for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Conference further expressed its satisfaction at the adherence by all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including Protocols I and II, but regretted that not all the nuclear-weapon States had adhered to the relevant protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). It commended efforts to conclude the Treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, especially in the Middle East and South-East Asia.

46. Mr. AITMATOV (Kyrgyzstan) introduced a paragraph to be included in the final document of the Conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia which read:

> "The Conference takes note of the interest of Kyrgyzstan in creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and considers that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia would contribute to the strengthening of peace, stability and security in this region."

47. In that regard, his delegation believed that such a zone, underpinned by legally binding and unequivocal security assurances, was the best way to prohibit sensitive nuclear activities which produced nuclear-weapon material. It would require stricter nuclear-export controls, such as full-scope safeguards in the importing State, and would enhance the effectiveness of safeguards by mutual inspections. His delegation hoped that the establishment of such a zone in Central Asia, a region which bordered on two powerful nuclear-weapon States, would enhance a willingness on their part to reduce their nuclear arsenals and would provide an element of stability that might eventually stretch southward to encompass areas that were sensitive in terms of nuclear proliferation.

48. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that he supported the working paper introduced by New Zealand (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.16). He noted that the sponsors of the working paper included States that were parties to the three existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as a number of African countries, reflecting the rapid progress being made towards the conclusion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the African continent. It was also significant that the sponsors indicated their support for other countries which also aspired to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in their own regions.

49. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) said that his country was a sponsor of the working paper submitted by New Zealand. His Government strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, and was particularly happy at the progress being made towards that end in the African continent. He encouraged States in other regions to intensify their activities towards the goal of denuclearization.

50. Mr. YARKA (Papua New Guinea) said he endorsed the working papers introduced by China, Egypt and New Zealand. His Government attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. He noted with disappointment that a number of nuclear-weapon States had not yet signed the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. Their refusal to do so raised questions about their

sincerity. He suggested that the Committee should consider the possibility of including in the text on article VII a phrase that would provide for a specific time-frame to be set for nuclear-weapon States to accede to the relevant protocols to nuclear-free-zone treaties. He complimented China and the Russian Federation on their swift action in signing the Rarotonga protocols. He also pointed out that dependent territories were excluded from effective participation in denuclearization unless the administrating Powers acceded to the relevant protocols. It was of the utmost importance that such territories should be included in the nuclear-free zones.

51. Mr. SAINT-MIEUY (France) said that the Egyptian working paper (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13) was acceptable to his delegation. He suggested that paragraph 1 should be amended to read:

> "The Conference reaffirms that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States is an important non-proliferation and disarmament measure. In the establishment of such zones, account must be taken of the particular characteristics of each region."

52. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that his delegation, which strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, would need time to study the working papers that had just been submitted.

53. Mr. DE ICAZA (Mexico) said that his delegation was a sponsor of the working paper introduced by New Zealand (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.16). As depositary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, his Government attached great importance to the recent accession to that Treaty of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba and Guyana. The Latin American and Caribbean region had thus become the first densely inhabited zone to be unconditionally free of nuclear weapons. At the request of certain States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, his delegation would seek to have some recognition of that important fact inserted in the final text when the drafting group took up its examination of the text.

54. His delegation endorsed the amendment to working paper 13 proposed by France, which was similar to paragraph 2 of working paper 16.

55. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) reiterated his Government's support for efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and in other regions. On the question of modalities for the application of safeguards, he stressed the importance of early studies concerning verification, bearing in mind the special characteristics of each region.

56. Mr. ODAGA-JALAMAYO (Uganda) said that in general terms, his delegation agreed with the proposals in working papers 13 and 16; however, it would have to wait until they were circulated before taking a definite stand. He had some concerns regarding the definition of "region". There were some small islands which should fall within the African region and which were known to contain nuclear arsenals. When African States claimed that those islands belonged to the African region, they were told that the islands did not belong to that region.

57. Mr. ERFAN (Egypt) said that in principle, his delegation was willing to accept the French proposal to amend working paper 13, which he understood to reflect two main concerns, namely, that arrangements should be freely arrived at, and that the specific characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/SR.7
10 May 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

MAIN COMMITTEE II

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 1 May 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

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ROLE OF THE TREATY IN THE PROMOTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND MEASURES AIMED AT PROMOTING WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

ROLE OF THE TREATY IN THE PROMOTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND MEASURES AIMED AT PROMOTING WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY

1. The CHAIRMAN, after summarizing the Committee's work thus far, said that, although required to consider the question of a wider acceptance of the Treaty, the Committee was not expected to report on that subject.

2. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that the Committee must nevertheless deal with the issue, because of the close connection between it and the work already undertaken on questions relating to article III, especially the requirement that full-scope safeguards should be accepted as a precondition for any transfer of fissionable material or products. Three more delegations, those of Armenia, Belgium and Thailand, wished to co-sponsor document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.15, which Australia had introduced on Friday, 28 April, on behalf of its many sponsors.

3. Regarding the question of the universality or wider acceptance of the Treaty, the fifth Review Conference should not restrict itself to renewing the appeals for universality made at preceding Conferences but should deal with the matter in greater depth. During the general debate in the plenary Conference, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that the Treaty contained international rules of conduct. It was a source of great satisfaction that the number of States parties to the Treaty had increased and that only 12 non-parties remained, some of which had announced their intention to accede to the Treaty. A sensible approach might be to enter into direct contact with those countries with a view to encouraging them to accede, thereby ensuring that those last 12 hurdles to be cleared before the goal was reached were the main focus of the future strengthened review of the operation of the Treaty.

4. Ms. SAYAF (Syrian Arab Republic) said that universality was indeed an essential feature of the Treaty's effectiveness and that all States not yet parties should accede to it. That was especially relevant in the case of Israel, which should become a party to the Treaty and subject its installations to IAEA safeguards, given the importance of such a decision for peace and security throughout the region.

5. Mr. SHOUKRY (Egypt) said that countries which had not yet acceded to the Treaty represented a threat to international peace and security. The difficulties which non-proliferation still posed were caused by the non-universal character of the Treaty.

6. The CHAIRMAN said that, in response to the request of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and provided that the Committee had no objection, the deadline for the submission of working papers would be changed to 6 p.m.

7. It was so decided.

8. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said that he fully shared the views expressed by the Australian representative on the question of the universality of the Treaty, which should be an absolute requirement. The Australian representative having referred to the fact that the Treaty established to some extent international rules of conduct, he would point out that the head of the Jordanian delegation had stated in the plenary Conference that nuclear weapons were so abominable that anyone who sought to acquire them should be considered an outlaw from the standpoint of international law. He also endorsed the views expressed by the representatives of Syria and Egypt regarding Israel's accession to the Treaty and its submission to IAEA safeguards.

9. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) associated himself with the views of the Australian representative in connection with the universality of the Treaty and expressed satisfaction that only a handful of States had not yet become parties. Although few, those States were nevertheless of crucial importance in their respective regions. The international community should accordingly establish conditions conducive to peace and security in those regions, thereby encouraging States which were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it.

10. It was worth mentioning that many States were unhappy about the implementation of some provisions of the Treaty, especially article VI; that situation also might impede universality. The States parties, especially those with nuclear weapons, should renew their commitment to nuclear disarmament so as to encourage other States to accede to the Treaty. He would remind the Committee that, in 1989, Nigeria had made a proposal with respect to negative security assurances which, if adopted, would be a step in the right direction. Progress had definitely been made towards universality, but there were still many problems to be settled.

11. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that universality in terms of accession was not sufficient; it was also necessary to ensure universality in terms of the implementation of the Treaty, namely the universality of full-scope safeguards. As the Australian representative had explained, mechanisms reflecting the interests of all groups of countries should be envisaged. The implementation of the provisions of the Treaty should be both predictable and reliable. If those conditions were met, the States parties to the Treaty would know exactly why they were parties and would firmly uphold the Treaty's principal goals. Total acceptance of the spirit of the Treaty was the surest way to encourage the remaining States to become parties in their turn.

12. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) associated himself with the Australian representative in supporting the principle of universality but thought that ways of attaining such universality must be found. As the Austrian representative had explained, modalities for implementing the provisions of the Treaty, especially article III, must be predictable and reliable. The Committee must give special attention to that question. States which were not yet parties to the Treaty would certainly be encouraged to accede to it if they saw those two concepts become reality.

13. Mr. AYATOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he endorsed the comments of previous delegations and approved in advance anything the Conference could do to persuade non-parties to accede to the Treaty, especially Israel. It

must be explained to them that their security assurances were not automatically increased because of their hesitations and that accession to the Treaty was the best of all possible assurances. In any event, the universality of the Treaty must go hand in hand with the implementation of all its provisions, whose application was extremely important not only to maintain peace but also in respect of security assurances and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

14. The CHAIRMAN reviewed the documentation before the Committee and the items referred to it which it had dealt with. He announced that the consideration of agenda item 17 had been concluded.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.